MOODY v. STEGGLES.

the trial. All that the plaintiff is required to prove is title in himself, and a conversion by the defendant. In this case the title is
not in dispute, and when the plaintiff proves that the defendant was
driving his horse from Waterbury to Southington, and that while
doing so he wilfully or negligently drove him in such a manner as
to cause his death, is not his case fully proved? It is quite immaterial how the horse came to be in the defendant's possession. Whether
lawfully or unlawfully is not of the slightest consequence. He may
have found him in the highway; he may have hired him from a
stranger; he may have taken him from the plaintiff's stable, with
or without leave, upon a week day, or upon the Sabbath; it is all
the same. The plaintiff is bound to offer no proof on the subject.
If the defendant would derive any benefit from the illegal contract
he is the one to prove it; and when he attempts to do so, he is met
with the objection that he cannot avail himself of an illegal transaction in which he participated as a defence to the action."
Upon the same principle it is conceived that where, in similar
eases, there has been collateral damage but no conversion, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in trespass or case (according to the
facts), and that in these actions, as in trover, the means by which
the possession was acquired would be immaterial. This might
serve to harmonize the decisions, and while recognising the liability,
would preserve intact the principles upon which the different forms
of action depend.
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MOODY v. STEGGLES.
A. and B. were respectively owners of two houses which adjoined each other, A.
using his house as a public house. Both the houses were formerly in the possession
of P. When A.'s house was conveyed to P. it was not used as a public house, and
there was no evidence to show when it was first used for that purpose. After the
death of P. his devisees conveyed the house, now in A.'s possession, to his predecessors in title, the house now in B.'s possession having been previously conveyed to
his predecessors in title. For more than forty years, a signboard with the name of
A.'s public house on it had been fixed to the wall of B.'s house. B. having taken
down the signboard, held, that it having been there for so many years, it must be
presumed that it was placed there by virtue of some easement granted to A.'s pre.
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decessors in title, there being no evidence to the contrary, and an injunction was
granted, restraining B. from moving it.
It is not necessary that there should be a physical connection between the dominant tenement and the easement.

THIS was an action for an injunction to restrain the defendants
from removing a signboard which was fixed to their house.
The plaintiffs were the owner and occupier of a public house in
Newmarket, called the Grosvenor Arms, which is situated in a
narrow street or yard called Grosvenor yard, running out of the
High street. The defendants were the owners of a house which
is situated at the corner of the High street and Grosvenor yard
and immediately adjoiining the public house.
The defendants' house projected in front of the public house, so
that it could not be seen from the High street.
In 1819, the plaintiffs' house was purchased by a Mr. Parkin
son, who was then owner of the defendants' house. At that time,
the plaintiffs' house was not used as an inn, and there was no evidence to show when it was first used for that purpose.
In 1883, the devisees of Parkinson, who was then dead, con
veyed the plaintiffs' house to the plaintiffs' predecessor in title.
Some time previously the defendants' house had been conveyed to
a predecessor in title of the defendants.
It was proved that for more than forty years a signboard had
been fixed to the defendants' house, at the entrance of Grosvenor
yard, bearing the name of the public house. At the time of the
Newmarket Spring Meeting this year, the defendants took down
the signboard and placed it on the plaintiffs' premises. It was put
up again temporarily, and this action was brought to try the plaintiffs' right to have it fixed to the defendants' house.
ATorth, Q. 0., and Stirling, for plaintiffs, referred to Wood v.
Hewett, 8 Q. B. 913; Lancaster v. Eve, 5 0. B. (N. S.) 717;
Hoare v. Metropolitan Board of Works, Law Rep. 9 Q. B. 296.
Cookson, Q. C., and Aaidlow, for defendants, referred to Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 0. B. 164; Keppell v. Bailey, 2 M. & K. 517;
Hill v. Tupper, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 725; Thomas v. Hayward,Law
Rep. 4 Exch. 311; Angus v. Dalton, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
85 (17 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 645); Wheeldon v. Burrows, Eng.
W. N. 1879, p. 123 (18 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 646).
F y,

.- The plaintiffs sue in this case in respect of a signboard
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which for many years has been hanging against the defendants'
house. It appears that the defendants are the owners and occupiers of a house in the High street, Newmarket, and behind that
house and at the side of it, there runs a yard or narrow street,
which is called Grosvenor yard, and up that yard the plaintiffs have
a house, which for a good many years past has been and still is
used as a public house. It is in evidence before me that for a
period of from forty to fifty years, at least, a signboard has been
hung against the side of the defendants' house and at the entrance
to Grosvenor yard, thereby inviting passengers going along the
High. street of the town to the plaintiffs' house. That signboard
having existed there for that length of time, and not having been
shown to have been erected by the license or permission of the
defendants or of their predecessors in title, and being entirely convenient and in one sense necessary for the enjoyment of the plaintiffs' premises, I think it is a case in which I am bound, if I legally
so can do, to presume a legal origin and continuance to that fact.
Where there has been a long enjoyment of property in a particular
manner, it is the habit, and in my view, the duty of the court, as
far as it lawfully can, to clothe fact with right. Looking at all the
facts of this case, I feel myself both justified and bound to come
to the conclusion that the chattel, the signboard, has been placed
by the plaintiffs' predecessors in title on the defendants' house, not
with the view of allowing that chattel to become part of the property of the defendants' predecessors in title, but by virtue oft such
easement granted by those predecessors in title to the plaintiiV'
predecessors in title.
In coming to that conclusion, I feel myself entirely justified to
act upon the three cases which have been cited to me on behalf of
the plaintiffs, viz.: Wfood v. Hewitt, Lancaster v. Eve and Hoare
v. The Metropolitan Board of Works. It is said, however, that in
this case there are circumstances which prevent the application of
the principle there laid down. The first objection is placed upon
the early common ownership of the tenements. Now the history
of that, so far as it appears before me, is this: In January 1819,
the house, now the plaintiffs', was purchased by Mfr. Parkinson,
who at that time was the owner of the defendants' house, and therefore on and after the 7th January 1819, the two tenements became
the property of Mr. Parkinson. At that time, however, the plaintiffs' houso was not occupied as an inn, but apparently as a private
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house. The next aate of which we have any knowledge at all is
1833. It appears that at that time Parkinson was dead. Parkinson's devisees conveyed the plaintiffs' house to Mr. Meody,
the predecessor in title of the present plaintiffs, and it appears that
before that date-how long before I do not know-the defendants'
house bad been conveyed by Parkinson, or Parkinson's devisees,
either to George Bloom or to a predecessor in title of George Bloom.
It is suggested that on these facts I ought to infer that the signboard was erected whilst the two tenements were the common property of Parkinson or his devisees. It appears to me I cannot
come to any such conclusion, because there is no evidence whatever
to show me whether the plaintiffs' house was converted into an inn
before or after the defendants' house was conveyed away by Parkinson. It is quite consistent with the facts before me, that the
defendants' house may have been alienated by Parkinson, years and
years before the plaintiffs' premises were converted into an inn,
and years before any signboard was fixed. That argument in my
judgment fails. What would have been the result if the defendants had proved the erection of this signboard during the common
ownership it is unnecessary for me to say.
The next argument which has been introduced on the part of the
defendant is this: It is said that the easement in question relates
not to the tenement, but to the business of the occupant of the
tenement, and therefore I ought not to tie the easement to the house.
It appears to me that that argument is. of too refined a nature to
prevail, and for this reason, the house can only be used by an
occupant, and that occupant only uses the house for the purpose in
life which he pursued; therefore in some manner (sometimes more
direct and sometimes more indirect) an easement is more or less
connected with the manner in which the occupant of the house uses
it. To take an illustration from the cases which have been cited
before me. The easement which was upheld in Wood v. Hfewitt
was an easement to have a hatch in another man's soil. That hatch
was only useful to the tenement occupied by the plaintiff so long as
he occupied it as a miller. Therefore in that sense the easement
was connected with the business of the occupant. So in Lancaster
v. Eve the easement was one to have a pile fixed in the water-way
of the Thames, which was useful so long only as the occupant of
the plaintiffs' premises used it for the purposes of a wharf. Similarly
in Hoare v. The Metropolitan Board of Works, which is still more

288

MOODY v. STEGGLES.

like the present case, the easement was to have a signboard sup.
ported by a pole fixed into the common, an easement which is useful
only so long as the occupant used the house for some purpose which
rendered an invitation to the public desirable. I think, therefore,
that argument fails.
Two other arguments have been addressed to me. Itis said that,
although you may have the easement for the support of a signboard
from the soil direct, you cannot have such an easement for the support of a signboard from a wall, which is fixed into the soil. That
argument appears to me to be untenable, because for all purposes
of support the wall must be taken to be part of the soil. It is part
of the freehold. I know no reason why a wall should not support
a signboard as well as a signboard be supported by a direct connection with the soil.
Lastly, it is said there must be a physical connection between the
dominant tenement and the easement. Now, I am not aware that
such law has ever been laid down. The cases which I have been
referred to are inconsistent with the theory. There was no physical
connection between the hatch which was the subject of discussion
in Woods v. Hewett. The easement there was to have that chattel
although that chattel was disconnected physically with the soil;
and the same observation applies to the case of ioare v. The Metropolitan Board of Works, and also with more or less distinctness
to Lancasterv. -Eve. And I may observe that for a very long
period the court has in certain cases substituted what I may call a
metaphysical for a physical connection with the soil. The old cases,
which have gone to show that chattels capable physically of disconnection with the tenement are nevertheless part of the freehold,
illustrate that principle. Everybody knows that a key, although
in its nature a chattel, belongs to the house, and passes with the
freehold; and that the millstone, which is capable of being detached
from the mill, is nevertheless part of the fee-simple of the mill, and
passes with it. These cases show that physical connection is not
always necessary, even to constitute a particular thing an integral
part of a fee-simple. One other argument remains to be considered,
which is this: it is said that the signboard creaks, and it is said
that the plaintiffs have no right to cause the annoyance which is
produced by the creaking of the signboard. Now it appears to me
from the evidence, that the signboard, if I may use such expression
creaks from its own nature. It is not easy and probably not pos-
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sible, to expose a wide surface of metal, such as this signboard
appears to be, to the action of the wind down this passage, without causing some creaking, and it appears to have always creaked
more or less. But the evidence goes to show that in the spring
of last year, it creaked rather more than usual, and then an interview took place between Mr. Vaughan, who was specially affected
by it, and the plaintiff, Miss Moody, in which she seems to have
offered him the use of the ladder, and to have invited him to grease
it himself, which invitation he refused. The whole thing with
regard to the creaking is of a trumpery description. It does not
appear to me that there has been any creaking in excess of what
is naturally incidental to a signboard, and certainly in the later
exercise of the right, the plaintiff has studiously desired to minimise the inconvenience to the defendant, because it has been erected
with India rubber washers, which undoubtedly have diminished
the noise to the greatest possible extent. Therefore, that defence
appears to me to be insignificant and idle. The result is that in
my judgment the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction which
they seek, and which will be to restrain the defendants and their
respective servants and agents from pulling down and removing
the said signboard from the said dwelling-house, and from preventing the plaintiffs or either of them from affixing the signboard to
the dwelling-house.
An easement, in its broadest sense,
may be called "a right to use another's
estate, for one's own benefit." It is a
right to use it, in distinction from a right
to take and carry away anything from it,
to use elsewhere ; this latter right being
familiarly known by the rather awkward
phrase profit a prendre. Among the
many uses to which another's estate may
be subject, under this right or easement,
besides the familiar ones of a right of
way, of support, for a drain, water-pipes,
&c., and those noticed in the principal
case, are a right of depositing merchandise on another's land, and hoisting
it up into the windows of the claimant's
building: Richardson v. Pond, 15 Gray
387 ; a right to swing one's doors, shutters, window-blinds, &c., over the adjacent land: United States v. Appleton, 1
Sumn. 492; Richardson v. Pond, supra;
Vor. XXVIII.-37

a right to have fire escapes overhang a
neighbor's soil: Havens v. Klein, 51
How. Pr. R. 82; a right to nail trees
to another's wall: Hawkins v. Wallis,
2 Wils. 173; to fasten a clothes-line to
his building: Drewell v. Towler, 3 B. &
Ad. 735 ; to use another's chimney for
conveyance of smoke: Hervey v. Smith,
22 Beav. 299 ; 1 Kay & Johns. 389 ; to
tether horses on his land: Johnson v.
Throughgood, Hob. 64; to pile logs,
beards or lumber thereon: Gurney v.
Ford, 2 Allen 576; Pollard v. Barnes.
2 Cush. 191 ; to deposit coal-dirt and
the refuse of a coal mine: Big Mountain Improvement Company's Appeal, 54
Penn. St. 361 ; a right of dockage and
bringing up vessels alongside of the
claimant's wharf, although the adverse
party owns the fee of the soil under the
dock: Sargent v. Ballard, 9 Pink. 251 ;
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Nicho,s v. Boston, 98 Mass. 39; to have
another's land remain for ever free, open,
and unobstructed by buildings: Parker
v. Nightingale, 6 Allen 341 ; Peck v.
Conway, 119 Mfass. 546 ; a right to wash
and water shecep and cattle in a neighbor's
pond: Manning v. Wasdale, 5 Ad. &
El. 758.
On the other hand a right to enter and
carry away anything from another's soil
though sometimes called an easement, is
much more; as to cut grass, or pasture
one's cattle: Bailey v. Appleyard, 8 Ad.
& E. 161 ; to hunt on another's land:
Pickering v. Noyes, 4 B. & C. 639 ;
Vickham v. Hawker, 7 M. & W. 63; to
fish in his brook or unnavigable stream:
Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. 145 ; to take
sand or stones, or seaweed from his
beach: Blewett v. Tregonning, 3 Ad. &
E. 554; Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 84; Constab!e v. Nicholson, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 230;
or coal from his land : Haff v. Me Cauley,
53 Penn. St. 206 ; to cutand carry away
trees growing on his land: Bailey v.
Stephens, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 91. See the
valuable case of The Tinicunm Fishing Co.
v. Carteri 61 Penn. St. 21.
But a right to take and carry away
water from a neighbor's spring, as it
issues from the ground, and not collected
by him in any tank, reservoir, cisterns,
&c., to be used for domestic purposes, is
not a profit d prendre, but only an easement; since water in such a condition is
held to be not a produce of the soil:
Race v. lWard, 4 E. & B. 702 ; Manning
v. Wasdale, 5 Ad. & E. 758; and see
Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 99.
In Littlefield v. Maxwell, 31 Me. 134,
it was held that a right to pile logs,
wood and lumber on another's land, to
such an extent as to practically deprive
him of the whole use of his premises,
was not merely an easement, but was
a profit d prendre, and, therefore, could
not be claimed by custom: sed quecre.
One main difference between a profit
a prendre and an easement, is that the
rorner is an interest in another's land,

and the latter only a right to use another's land ; and the consequent difference
in the mode of acquiring these respecti%e
rights.
One question discussed .n Meody v.
Steggles, was whether the dominant and
servient tenement must be adjacent or
contiguous. But there seems to,be no
necessity for any physical contiguity.
It is clear that if there be three lots of
land, A., B. and C., belonging to separate
owners, and the owner of A. has a right
of way by purchase over B., he may acquire by a prescription a way over lot C.,
in continuation of it, although A. and C.
nowhere touch each other: see Leonard
v. Leonard, 2 Allen 543. And in Perrin
v. Garfield, 37 Vt. 312, P.EcK, J., says,
"It is not necessary that the dominant
and servient tenement should be contiguous to each other."
And even in cases of an easement or
claim of a right of lateral support from
adjacent land, it is not necessary that the
servient estate should be immediately adjacent the dominant estate. This point
arose in the very recent case of fayor
of Birmningham v. Allen, Law Rep. 6
Oh. Div. 284.
The plaintiff and the defendant were
the owners of parcels of land, separated
from each other by a narrow strip of
land belonging to a third person. The
owner of this intervening strip had,
many years ago, worked out the coal
beneath it. The subsequent working
by the defendant of the coal under his
own land, caused, or threatened to
cause, a subsidence of the plaintiff's
land, and this action was brought to restrain him from such work. In considering the law applicable to the case, the
Master of the Rolls, starting with the proposition that a landowner is entitled to
have his land, in its natural state, supported by the land of his neighbor, said :
' Who is his neighbor? The neighboring owner for this purpose must be the
owner of that portion of land--it may be
a wider or a narrower strip of land-the

